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Fraud, Plot or Collective Delusion? Social Media and Perceptions of Electoral 
Misconduct in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum* 
Sarah Birch (King’s College London) and Fatma ElSafoury (University of Glasgow) 
 
ABSTRACT: Online discussions of electoral fraud are becoming an increasingly important 
aspect of the electoral landscape in many contexts, as cyberspace is one of the few places 
where concerns about electoral conduct can be aired openly and freely. But it is often difficult 
to assess what this online activity tells us about actual electoral processes. This paper 
analyzes a surge of tweets about electoral fraud at the time of the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014 in order to ascertain whether this online activity reflected: (a) actual 
offline fraud observed by the social media users, (b) a concerted effort to undermine 
confidence in electoral administration, or (c) a collective delusion. Data mining and machine 
learning techniques are deployed in this analysis, which comes out strongly in favour of the 
collective delusion hypothesis. 
 
KEYWORDS: electoral fraud, Scottish independence referendum, Twitter, text mining, 
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Fraud, Plot or Collective Delusion? Social Media and Perceptions of Electoral 
Misconduct in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum 
Social media has in recent years come to play a major role in elections. Communication 
taking place on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, online forums and other social platforms has 
become part of election debate, as was evident notably in the US presidential election of 2016 
(Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Le et al., 2017). Over the course of the past decade we have 
also witnessed a dramatic rise in the use of social media as a forum for discussing the 
mechanics of electoral administration, particularly in ‘contentious elections’ – elections 
where there is popular mobilization around the conduct of the poll (Diamond, 2010; Howard, 
2010; Ikufor, 2010; Norris, Frank and Martínez i Coma, 2015).1 Yet we have limited 
understanding of the relationship between the online discussion and the offline reality of 
electoral integrity. Is vigorous social media debate about electoral misconduct likely to be the 
‘smoke’ that points to the ‘fire’ of actual irregularities in the electoral process? Or ought such 
debates to be treated as forms of political communication that have no necessary referent in 
the real world but instead reflect attitudes and dispositions? Answers to these questions will 
inform the study of social media and ‘fake news’; they will also help students of electoral 
fraud to assess the relevance of online discussions of fraud. 
The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 is an interesting case where electoral 
administration - which had not in recent times been a subject of extensive popular debate or 
mobilization - was suddenly thrust into the spotlight largely via social media. Online 
                                                          
1  This type of social-media mobilization and online activism received considerable 
international attention at the time of the so-called ‘Twitter revolution’ in Moldova and the 
‘Green Revolution’ in Iran - both in 2009 - as well as various electoral events that formed 
part of the Arab Spring (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Diamond, 2010; Hänska-Ahy and 
Shapour, 2013; Margetts et al, 2015). 
3 
 
discussion during the referendum campaign reached unprecedented levels (Tierny, 2015), 
especially among ‘Yes’ supporters (Holby, 2014; Shephard et al., 2014), and several studies 
have analyzed the way in which social media discourse shaped debate about emergent news 
themes (Brigadir, 2015; Pedersen et al. 201d4; Quinlan, Shephard and Paterson, 2015; 
Shephard et al. 2014). Yet there has been no systematic consideration of the intense online 
debate about the conduct of the referendum, and this is a lacuna this paper seeks to fill, with a 
view to shedding light on the relationship between social media-based discussions of 
electoral fraud and fraud itself. 
Specifically, the aim of the paper is to deploy recently-developed data mining and text 
classification techniques from the burgeoning discipline of data science to assess social-
media discussion of electoral misconduct in the referendum campaign, in the aim of 
determining what offline political phenomena, if any, this discussion reflected. We consider 
three possibilities. The first possibility is that there was in fact electoral misconduct, and the 
social media discussion of this phenomenon was based on evidence of wrong-doing 
uncovered by the initiators of these exchanges. We label this for convenience the ‘fraud’ 
hypothesis, and it implies that the users of social media were fulfilling the function of ‘social 
sensors’, accurately detecting and reporting offline reality. The second possibility is that the 
social media discussion of electoral conduct was the result of an orchestrated effort by certain 
groups to discredit the referendum outcome; the ‘plot’ hypothesis sees a hard core of social 
media-savvy political activists shrewdly exploiting online tools to distort popular 
interpretation of offline electoral events. The third possibility is that there was no actual fraud 
and no orchestrated campaign to discredit the outcome, but that disappointment expressed 
online by individual ‘yes’ supporters led to the development of a form of spontaneous 
collective delusion in which those involved retroactively reinterpreted their personal 
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experience of the voting process and projected onto that experience concerns about fraud that 
had not occurred to them at the time. This we term the ‘collective delusion’ hypothesis.  
The objective of the analysis which follows is to analyze social media traffic before 
during and after the referendum in order to identify which of these hypotheses best accords 
with the patterns of interaction we observe. If the ‘fraud’ hypothesis is correct, we should 
expect to see concerns mainly being expressed at the time of the voting and counting, tailing 
off thereafter. If the ‘plot’ hypothesis is correct, we would in all probability observe 
discussion of malpractice beginning before polling day, as plans to discredit the poll were 
made and suspicions purposely sowed in the minds of voters. If, on the other hand, the social 
media discussions of fraud were the result of collective delusion, we would expect to see 
these discussions grow in volume after polling day as the ill-founded concern spread through 
cyberspace. A final possibility is that a combination of factors was at play; for example, there 
may have been a limited amount of genuine abuse, which was then magnified in the popular 
mind via one of the other two mechanisms identified – intentional or unintentional 
misinformation. 
The analysis has both methodological and theoretical ramifications that go well 
beyond Scottish politics, as it will help us to understand the relationship between the content 
of social media discussions and offline events, which will further our theoretical 
understanding of social media as political communication. The investigation will also inform 
event detection methods that are widely used on social media data (McCreadie et al, 2015; 
Minhas, Ulfelder and Ward, 2015; D’Orazio et al., 2014).  
The paper unfolds as follows: the next section identifies key aspects of the context 
surrounding the Scottish independence referendum in order to place the hypotheses and the 
empirical analysis in context. The second section of the paper explores the justification 
behind the three hypotheses set out briefly above, drawing on the literatures on social media, 
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social psychology and perceptions of electoral integrity. The third section describes the 
methods used to collect the data to test these hypotheses, while the fourth section details the 
results of the analysis. A final brief section concludes. 
 
I  The 2014 Scottish context 
The Scottish independence referendum of 18 September 2014, which could have led to 
Scotland being independent of the rest of the United Kingdom, resulted in a vote of 44.7 
percent ‘yes’ and 55.3 percent ‘no,’ hence maintenance of the Union in its current borders.2 
Perhaps the most interesting statistic is not, however, the overall result (which had long been 
predicted), but the referendum turnout of 84.6 percent. With electoral participation figures in 
Scotland and the rest of the UK in decline, the mobilization of over five-sixths of the 
electorate was a spectacular achievement, resulting in the highest turnout ever recorded in a 
Scotland-wide vote. Moreover, it meant that many of those voting were citizens who rarely 
made it to the polls and were largely disengaged from politics-as-usual. The UK Electoral 
Commission estimated that ten percent of those who took part in the referendum had not 
before voted (Electoral Commission, 2014b: 63). 
The unprecedented popular mobilization occasioned by the referendum can be seen as 
a positive development from the point of view of political engagement and participation. At 
the same time, it resulted in a number of unexpected challenges for electoral administrators, 
challenges that were logistical (the supply of polling venues and materials), educational 
(explaining the voting process to novice voters) and presentational (maintaining popular 
confidence in the electoral process). 
                                                          
2  The question put to the Scottish people was ‘Should Scotland be an independent 
country?’ 
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The UK context is one in which electoral administration had long been taken for 
granted and was very seldom a topic of political debate (James, 2012). This began to change 
somewhat following the Labour party’s ascent to power in 1997, when electoral reform 
emerged as one of the new government’s strategic goals. Reform gained momentum in the 
wake of the 2001 General Election, when a slump of turnout to 59 percent caused ripples 
throughout the political elite, leading to a number of years of hand-wringing about political 
disengagement. Electoral administrative reform was also given a boost by the formation of 
the Electoral Commission in 1999, a body that was afforded the capacity to carry out 
extensive research on electoral administration, including a series of pilots of new voting 
procedures starting in 2001, together with a number of studies of popular perceptions of the 
electoral process. Several of the reforms undertaken during this period spurred further debate, 
including the introduction of postal voting on demand, which is widely believed to have 
increased the vulnerability of UK electoral procedures to abuse. Following a string of high-
profile cases of postal vote fraud in 2003 and 2004, efforts were made to introduce measures 
to increase the security of elections. Thus the 21st century has been a time of heightened 
debate about electoral procedures in the UK. Nevertheless, this debate has been conducted 
largely by a small group of specialists who have a direct interest in the topic, including 
electoral officials, political elites, public officials and academics (Birch and Watt, 2004; 
Clarke, 2014a; Electoral Commission, 2014a; James, 2012; Watt, 2006; Wilkes-Heeg, 2008). 
Prior to 2014, the topic of electoral administration had only episodically engaged large 
sectors of the general public, and it is possible that this periodic popular interest in electoral 
administration is linked to the high stakes that have attended a number of recent electoral 
contests, especially the Scottish referendum on independence. 
Electoral misconduct arose as an issue before, during and after the Scottish 
independence referendum. Prior to the vote, there were a number of reports in the media 
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about administrative problems in some areas, popular concern that the election might be 
‘rigged,’ and even that the security services could be involved in electoral malfeasance (e.g. 
McTague, 2014; Maddox, 2014). Following the vote, a widely-reported online petition, 
which eventually garnered tens of thousands of signatures, demanded a recount of the 
referendum result on the grounds of fraud.3 Objects of particular concern included: violence 
and intimidation during the campaign and on polling day; possible problems with ballot 
integrity (including postal vote fraud); possible breaches of the chain of custody in the 
transport of ballot boxes from polling stations to counting centers; and possible miscounting.  
With social media playing an integral part in all aspects of the referendum process, 
from voter mobilization to debate and post mortem analysis, cyberspace was the principal 
arena in which concerns about electoral integrity were aired. In the end, very few of the 
allegations raised resulted in formal investigations, and the formal ‘yes’ camp conceded 
defeat without protest.  Each of the 32 counts was observed by multiple representatives 
(counting agents) of the two camps, as well as by official observers, elected representatives at 
various levels and Electoral Commission staff. According to the Electoral Commission, no 
recounts were requested by those present at any of the counting centers (Electoral 
Commission, 2014b: 130). 
With any event involving millions of people, there are bound to be some problems, 
however, and the Scottish independence referendum was no exception. In their official report 
on the referendum, the Electoral Commission listed a number of documented issues: 10 cases 
of alleged personation in Glasgow; staff involved in some counts having been previously 
                                                          
3  The petition can be found at: https://www.change.org/p/nicola-sturgeon-we-the-
undersigned-demand-a-revote-of-the-scottish-referendum-counted-by-impartial-international-
parties. 
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active in the campaign; voters in some polling stations not folding their ballot papers and not 
being required to do so by poll workers; a number of instances of attempted buying and 
selling of votes online; and the ‘sampling’ (illicit counting) of postal votes during the formal 
verification process prior to counting (Electoral Commission, 2014b; 132-1). There is also 
evidence from the Scottish Assessors Association of widespread abuse of the system for 
applying for proxy votes prior to the referendum (SSA, 2014).  
It is unlikely that any of the documented problems could have had more than a 
miniscule impact on the outcome of the vote. The main effect such problems appear to have 
had was to raise popular suspicion in a context where many voters were already on the alert. 
Research conducted by the Election Commission suggested that by and large, the Scottish 
electorate was satisfied with the conduct of the referendum; a total of 94 percent of survey 
respondents who voted at polling stations and 98 percent of those who voted by post reported 
being happy with the way the poll was conducted (Electoral Commission, 2014b: 1). At the 
same time, the Electoral Commission acknowledged that concerns over electoral integrity 
were somewhat higher at the time of the referendum than in previous electoral events in 
Scotland. A total of 34 percent of respondents in the Commission’s post-referendum survey 
thought that fraud had taken place. To put these figures in perspective, 30 percent of those 
surveyed by the Commission after the 2014 European parliamentary election had believed 
that fraud had taken place at those elections, and the figure for the Scottish local government 
elections of 2012 was 28 percent (Electoral Commission, 2014b; 76). Thus, an additional 4-6 
percent of the population believed that there had been fraud in the referendum, an increase of 
approximately 20 percent over previous elections. The Commission also found that 42 
percent of ‘Yes’ voters but only 21 percent of ‘No’ voters believed there had been fraud in 
the referendum (Electoral Commission 2014b: 76). 
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Most who believed there had been fraud claimed to hold this view because of media 
reports; very few of those who voiced concerns about fraud did so on the basis of personal 
experience, a fact in which the Commission found consolation: “While electoral fraud is 
often thought to occur we found no increase in people who had had first-hand experience of 
fraud. 53% of respondents thought that electoral fraud was not a problem and 26% indicated 
that they did not know if it was a problem. This reflects the Commission’s view that 
confidence in the safety and security of the voting process can be strongly influenced by the 
wider context and in particular the reporting of alleged electoral abuse in the media. Just 
under a third of our survey respondents (32%) reported knowing hardly anything about fraud 
relating to elections and voting, with 16% saying that they knew nothing at all about the 
subject” (Electoral Commission, 2014b: 77). 
At the same time, the Commission was obliged to recognize that the figure of 73 
percent who through voting had been generally safe from fraud was lower than at other recent 
elections. On the basis of these findings, the Electoral Commission acknowledged the “need 
to address the issue of how we make the public more aware of count procedures.” (Electoral 
Commission, 2014b: 15, 80), noting that “there continues […] to be a lack of confidence that 
voting is safe from fraud and abuse when in reality the level of allegations of electoral fraud 
are low in Scotland” (Electoral Commission, 2014b: 80). 
In sum, the evidence available from official bodies suggested very limited actual 
misconduct, and the problems that did occur were not of such a nature as to have any 
perceptible impact on the result. The possibility remains that there was wrong-doing, but that 
it was effectively concealed by the perpetrators. Whatever the truth of the matter, there is no 
doubt that there developed among a not insignificant minority of the Scottish population 
serious concerns about the conduct of the referendum.  
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II  Theoretical perspectives on social media and electoral conduct 
The role of social media in documenting and discussing electoral misconduct is a nascent 
area of study that currently lacks a set of accepted theories or robust findings. In developing 
the hypotheses to be tested here, we draw on the literatures on social psychology and the role 
of social media in creating and spreading misinformation, together with insights from the 
growing sub-field of electoral integrity studies. 
Three possible links between online discussion of electoral misconduct and offline 
reality were sketched above. First, it is possible that there was some electoral malpractice in 
the referendum, and that social media debate was picking up on something that is of genuine 
concern to electoral governance. If, on the other hand, the claims of electoral misconduct 
voiced online were entirely or very largely without foundation, then efforts to portray the 
referendum as having been misconducted were instances of misinformation, which can been 
intentional or unintentional. The second hypothesis we explore is that of intentional 
misinformation, namely that concerns about electoral integrity were ‘seeded’ online in a 
deliberate attempt to discredit the conduct of the referendum in the eyes of the people, so as 
to call into question the legitimacy of the result. Third, it is possible that the online frenzy 
that arose at the time of the referendum around the topic of electoral abuse was an episode of 
unintentional misinformation, a crisis of mass confidence or collective delusion about 
electoral conduct. We explore the causal mechanism behind each of these hypotheses in turn, 
bearing in mind that there could be an element of truth in more than one of them. 
These hypotheses can be summarized as follows: 
H1: There was more fraud at the referendum than was acknowledged by officials, and 
social media discussion reflected this reality. 
H2: Discussion of fraud on social media was a deliberate attempt by the initiators of 
the discussion to discredit the referendum. 
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H3: Discussion of fraud on social media was the result of a collective delusion. 
 
Fraud hypothesis:  
The UK is generally recognized as a state with a high degree of electoral integrity, and there 
is no precedent for large-scale electoral manipulation in mainland Britain (Clarke, 2014a; 
Electoral Commission, 2014a; James, 2012; Watt, 2006; Wilkes-Heeg, 2008). That said, 
isolated incidents of electoral abuse have been documented, and there is evidence that the 
frequency of such incidents has increased in recent years in the United Kingdom (Clarke, 
2014a; James, 2012). A report on electoral fraud released by the Electoral Commission in 
January of 2014 identified 16 local authorities in the UK where elections had repeatedly been 
beset by problems; none of these is located in Scotland (Electoral Commission, 2014a).  
Yet the poor printing of ballot papers in the Scottish Parliament election of 2007 and 
the subsequent spike in invalid ballots had already raised the salience of electoral 
administration in the popular mind (Clarke, 2014a: 171). The scathing Gould report on these 
problems, which found that voters had been treated as an ‘afterthought’ by electoral 
administrators, hardly inspired confidence on the part of the electorate, although this episode 
had also led to a major overhaul of Scottish electoral administration and the establishment of 
a new Electoral Management Board (Clarke, 2014b). The closeness of the race in 2014 was 
also undoubtedly a factor in heightening awareness of possible wrong-doing. We know from 
comparative evidence that fraud is more likely in high-stakes elections (Birch, 2011), and 
given the stake involved in the independence referendum was the establishment of a new 
state, they were extremely high in this case. The fact that the referendum was carried out on 
the basis of new and untested legislation (the Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013) 
further increased the possibility that problems would arise, as potential fraudsters were more 
likely to be able to find loopholes in the law that they could exploit. It is thus entirely 
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possible that there was at least some wrong-doing in the referendum, and all else being equal, 
wrong-doing is more likely in this poll than in most electoral events held in the UK.  
Serious concerns were raised by a number of groups that analyzed the referendum. 
Russian observer Georgy Fyodorov, of the Association for the Protection of Electoral Rights 
"Civil Control" told a Russian news agency that “according to what our observers at the 
polling offices tell us, there were more Yes votes during the vote count … Those on the UK 
side campaigning for a No vote resorted to every violation imaginable” (Sputnik News, 
2014). Well-know American political commentator Naomi Wolf publicized concerns that 
many referendum ballots lacked the Unique Identifying Numbers necessary to make them 
valid (Wolf, 2014). Another analysis focused on suspiciously high postal vote turnout in 
Argyle and Bute, claiming that known inaccuracies in the electoral register together with 
natural trends in population movement and mortality mean that the reported postal vote 
turnout of over 95 percent would have been virtually impossible to achieve without 
manipulation (Democratic Socialist Federation, n.d.). Unlike the official reports cited above, 
these reports rated as serious the irregularities that allegedly marred the referendum. 
 
Plot hypothesis:  
The use of media to disseminate unwarranted concerns about electoral conduct during the 
pre-electoral period is regularly practiced by opposition activists in many countries, 
especially when it is clear in advance of the election that they have little hope of winning 
(Beaulieu, 2014; Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Schedler, 2013: chap. 9). In many electoral 
contexts, opposition leaders will prime the electorate to expect fraud by means of 
communication strategies that emphasize risks to electoral integrity and speculate about 
possible plans by their political rivals (in particular incumbent leaders) to ‘steal’ the election, 
as was evident in the 2016 US presidential election campaign. A recent paper on local 
newspaper coverage of electoral fraud in the US finds the number of stories on electoral 
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abuse to be highest in states where fraud had been a topic of debate and legislative activity at 
the elite level, but that coverage was unrelated to the incidence of actual fraud in the state 
(Fogarty et al, 2015). If effective, such priming strategies could be expected to lead voters to 
interpret innocuous occurrences or minor logistical snarls as evidence of serious electoral 
misconduct. It is thus plausible that political elites and activists might seek to use the social 
media platforms at their disposal to prime voters in advance of the poll to be suspicious about 
the electoral process. 
In the Scottish context, one question that immediately arises is who might seek to 
discredit the outcome of the independence poll. Much of the debate about electoral 
malpractice took place in online spaces dominated by the ‘Yes’ camp. The ‘Yes’ camp had a 
significant challenge in that a minority of Scottish voters had historically favored 
independence. In the final months of the campaign, opinion polls suggested that though the 
‘No’ side remained in the lead, the ‘Yes’ camp was gaining ground; two polls released in the 
fortnight leading up to the vote even put ‘Yes’ ahead of ‘No’. Yet on the eve of the poll, most 
surveys still pointed to a ‘No’ win (see Figure 1).  It is therefore likely that any plan to 
discredit the referendum would have come from supporters of the ‘Yes’ option.  
Figure 1 about here 
There is some evidence of an orchestrated campaign to breed suspicion of the voting process 
among electors. The Electoral Commission reported having received a number of queries 
prior to polling day about the use of writing implements to mark ballots (pens v pencils), the 
folding of ballot papers, and the role of the Unique Identifying Number on the back of the 
ballot paper (Electoral Commission, 2014b: 134-6). Political scientist and official referendum 
election observer Alistair Clarke reported that many voters arrived at the polling station 
already suspicious about the process in which they were taking part (Clarke, 2014c). As noted 
above, there had been several newspaper reports prior to election day of possible problems, 
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though it is also possible that many voters’ suspicions were derived from other sources. The 
question that concerns us here is whether there is any evidence that social media was 
systematically seeded in advance of polling day with messages designed to breed suspicion 
about the electoral process.  
 
Collective delusion hypothesis:  
One of the key characteristics of social media is that traditional forms of political leadership 
and planning are not required for mass mobilization to occur; the spontaneous formation and 
expression of group sentiment is enabled by the open and non-hierarchical format of the 
online world (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Margetts et al, 2015). This means that it is 
perfectly possible for collective delusion to have arisen online organically, without ‘plotters’ 
intentionally seeding cyberspace with concerns about electoral fraud. What interests us for 
the moment is why and how such a phenomenon might arise. 
The growing literature on confidence in elections has identified a considerable gap 
even in established democracies between elite and popular perceptions of the integrity of 
electoral processes (Anderson et al., 2005; Atkeson and Saunders, 2007; Birch, 2010; Hall, 
Monson and Kelly, 2009). The literature on ‘losers’ consent’ has found that in many states, 
being on the losing side of an electoral contest is associated with a more critical view of 
electoral conduct (Anderson et al., 2005), and that voters’ estimation of the integrity of the 
election changes following the outcome (Cantu, 2014). 
The literature on conspiracy theories is also instructive in this regard. In their book-
length study, Uscinski and Parent identify 50 major conspiracy theories in the United States 
between 1890 and 2010. Of these, 14 percent (7) were theories about election rigging 
(Uscinski and Parent, 2014: 59-62). This is a remarkably high proportion, given the many 
things people might theorize about; it therefore appears that electoral conduct is a topic that is 
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highly vulnerable to conspiracy theorizing. Uscinski and Parent concur, arguing that 
“conspiracy theories are for losers” in the sense that those who support losing electoral 
options are more likely to espouse beliefs in that covert manipulation of elections by malign 
political agents was responsible for the outcome (Uscinski and Parent, 2014: 22, 91-2, 138-
43). In other research, speculative and even fictional accounts of conspiracy theories 
involving state actors have been found to make people more willing to believe in such 
theories (Butler, Koopman and Zimbardo, 1995; Douglas and Sutton, 2008; Mulligan and 
Habel, 2013), and we can anticipate that the same would be true of online discussion.  
The ‘sour grapes’ argument chimes with research on confirmation bias. We know that 
people are ‘motivated reasoners’ who rate more highly arguments associated with outcomes 
of which they approve (Baron and Hershey, 1988; Kunda, 1990), and that ideological 
position has a strong impact on political belief, with people more likely to convince 
themselves of theories that confirm their ideological world view (Lodge and Taber, 2013; 
Pasek et al., 2014; Redlawsk, 2002). In as much as many social media users were hooked into 
dense networks of other users whose views reinforced each other, social media use during the 
polarized atmosphere of the referendum campaign may have served to magnify this effect.  
Evidence from social psychology suggests that belief corroboration tends to lead to 
more extreme views (Baron et al., 1996), and some scholars have maintained that new media 
usages leads to online sorting or homophily, generating ‘echo chambers’ where people tend 
to consume information that reinforces their pre-existing opinions (Sunstein, 2002; Farrell, 
2012). If this theory is correct, the online sorting effect could have served to increase the 
perceived veracity of claims of fraud. In other words, observation of these claims being 
repeated strengthened people’s impression that they must reflect valid concerns about the 
conduct of the referendum. 
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Yet there is also evidence from recent studies that the homophily characteristic of 
much online activity is less pronounced in Twitter use, which has the effect of reducing issue 
polarization (Barberá, 2014; 2015; Yardi and Boyd, 2010). People monitoring Twitter 
streams organized around particular hashtags are likely to be exposed to a wide variety of 
competing beliefs, including views that differ considerably from their own. There is thus 
reason to believe that interaction on at least some social media platforms should lessen the 
‘echo chamber’ effect. This could be expected to work against the generation of collective 
delusion.   On Facebook, where people select the contacts from whom they get postings 
though, homophily is likely to be more marked.  
The final possibility that deserves to be explored is that social media served to 
significantly magnify in the popular mind what was in fact a very limited amount of electoral 
abuse. When people hear that a particular problem may have affected ‘dozens’ or ‘hundreds’ 
of ballots, this many seem like a large number, whereas in fact it represents a minute 
proportion of the overall electorate and is highly unlikely to have a material impact on the 
outcome. The reported issues with proxy voting mentioned above are a case in point, as are 
reports of polling cards being sent to small children in East Ayrshire (Maddox, 2014). There 
are two common thought processes which could account for this phenomenon: miscalculation 
and the propensity to view available evidence as the ‘tip of the iceberg.’ We know from 
behavioral economics that many people have a poor understanding of basic mathematical 
concepts such as proportions and frequencies (Gigerenzer, 2002; Tversky and Kahnemann, 
1982). We also know from research on perceptions of politics that British citizens have a 
tendency to view revealed wrongdoing as the ‘tip of the iceberg’ (Allen and Birch, 2015). 
Reports of minor irregularities could thus get magnified in the popular mind if extensively 
publicized. 
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In the UK, concern increased following a spate of instances of electoral abuse in the 
mid 2000s that were widely reported in the media (Wilkes-Heeg, 2008; James, 2012). At the 
time of the Scottish independence referendum, there were ongoing investigations of several 
cases of suspected electoral misconduct alleged to have taken place in the 2014 local 
elections, including a widely-reported and high-profile case in the London borough of Tower 
Hamlets. Another factor that is likely to have magnified concern is the fact that many of those 
who took part in the referendum were not habitual voters and were thus not familiar with 
voting procedures. It is possible that social media communication around the referendum 
enhanced these concerns in the minds of some voters and caused them to believe that 
widespread fraud had taken place in the absence of objective evidence of irregularities. 
Thus conjecture about possible fraudulent acts, however outlandish, might have increased 
people’s propensity to believe in conspiracy theories.  
 
III  Modeling and Classifying Twitter Discussion of Fraud During the Independence 
Referendum 
 
In order to distinguish between the three interpretations empirically, we rely on the temporal 
distribution of social media activity that we would expect each of these three processes to 
involve. We select Twitter for empirical testing of our models due to its public nature and 
availability. We focus in particular on the initiation of Twitter traffic related to fraud, as the 
onset of such Twitter activity represents a useful observable implication of our theoretical 
expectations.  
If the referendum was beset by substantial actual fraud of the type alleged, involving 
voter registration, voting and vote counting, we would expect to see online expressions of 
concern begin to mount gradually in the hours leading up to the opening of the polls, and gain 
intensity during the period of approximately 24 hours when the votes were cast and counted 
and the results widely disseminated, as it is during this period that voters would be tuned into 
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the mechanics of the electoral process and it is then that they would have had the opportunity 
to witness malpractice first-hand.4  
If, by contrast, the online discussion of fraud was intentionally ‘seeded’ in order to 
raise false concerns, we would expect to see the initiation of large amounts of online activity 
well before polling day, as efforts were made to sow doubts in people’s minds as to the 
credibility of the voting and encourage them to look for flaws in the process when they went 
to vote.  
Finally, if the online discussion of electoral irregularities was the result of collective 
delusion, we would expect to see a spike in social media activity immediately after the results 
were announced, as disillusioned ‘Yes’ supporters reinterpreted their voting experience and 
began to believe accounts of abuse.5  
It is possible that what we will observe empirically is a mix of these three pure 
models, but the onset of intensive discussion of electoral fraud should provide a good 
indicator of which hypothesis has the most traction.  
                                                          
4 Whether Twitter activity of this sort dies off gradually thereafter as authorities either 
address the problem or refuse to countenance allegations of wrong-doing, or whether activity 
continues to increase as concerns mount and ‘informational cascades’ (Lohmann, 1994) form 
is not particularly relevant to this analysis, as our main interest is in when Twitter activity 
around fraud begins in earnest. 
5  In a study of tweets in Arabic about the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013, tweets 
classed as evidencing beliefs in conspiracy theories peaked over a week after the event itself, 
whereas tweets that fell into the four other categories employed by the researchers all peaked 
sooner, mostly within 48 hours of the event (Jamal et al, 2015: 65). 
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We now detail how we identified, categorized, harvested and analyzed relevant social 
media discussions in order to test these alternative possibilities. For the sake of convenience, 
we categorize possible acts of electoral misconduct according to stage of the referendum 
process: violations of democratic campaign norms prior to the vote; violations of voting 
procedures; problems with the ‘chain of custody’ that ensures ballots are handled 
appropriately and securely from the time they are cast to the time they are counted; and 
problems with the counting of ballots. During the campaign, there were also concerns 
revolved around allegations of inappropriate acts of harassment, intimidation and actual or 
threatened violence; we classify discussion of violence of this type as misconduct also. 
As noted above, we rely on analysis of communication on Twitter, due to its public 
nature, its instantaneous dissemination and its ready availability to researchers. The public 
nature of Twitter means that tweets were widely disseminated among large groups who were 
actively involved in online discussions of the referendum. The instantaneous aspect of 
Twitter makes it possible to undertake very fine-grained analysis of temporal trends. The 
availability of tweets renders them an amenable data source; unlike the partially-public world 
of Facebook, the Twitterverse is almost all in the public realm, obviating concerns about the 
possible confounds associated with personal contacts between users. 
We collected a corpus of tweets sent during a period extending from 10 days before to 
10 days after the Scottish independence referendum, which took place on 18 September 2014 
– in other words, from 8 to 28 September. The corpus collected includes 222 gigabytes of 
material. Filtration was used to remove non-English language tweets and to get retain only 
the tweets that contain relevant keywords known from previous research and perusal of news 
websites to be associated with the independence referendum. These include: Scotland, 
Scottish, Referendum, Voting, Votes, Indyref, ScottishAnimals, Ballots, and Elections. This 
filtration resulted in a corpus of 8,120,039 tweets.  A 10 per cent sample of this corpus was 
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drawn from each day to reduce the processing time required for the classification task; this 
included the first one per cent of each decile of Tweets for that day.  The resulting sample for 
the 21-day period included 999,790 tweets, which was used in the subsequent analysis. 
In order to identify the best classification strategy, we tested three classifier models 
commonly used in the field of machine learning: Naïve Bayes (NB) (Weiss, Indurkhya, 
Zhang, & Damerau, 2005), Decision Trees (DT) (Manning & Schütze, 1999) and Support 
Vector Machine (Kubat, 2015). These tests, detailed in the Appendix, demonstrated that the 
Support Vector Machine approach was superior to the other strategies. 
 
IV  Results 
The Support Vector Machine model was applied to classify the entire corpus of 999,790 
tweets harvested from the period 8 – 28 September 2014. The results of the classification 
process are shown in the Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
We next divide each day to four time periods: the first from midnight to 5.59am, the second 
from 6.00am to 11.59am, the third from noon to 5.59pm and the last from 6.00pm to 
11.59pm. The spread of the fraud tweets over these four periods is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 about here 
The data in this graph are striking in what they reveal; with the exception of a brief spike in 
tweets on 13 September, which appears to have been mainly due to multiple retweets of a 
single rather vague tweet about fears of electoral manipulation,6 the vast majority of tweets 
related to fraud occur after the announcement of the referendum result. Moreover, there is a 
                                                          
6 The tweet reads: ‘Be left in absolutely no doubt Scotland we are being manipulated at the 
highest level. Take a deep breath; think logically’. 
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very large spike in such tweets immediately after the result was announced and it became 
apparent that the ‘no’ option had won. The number of tweets documenting fraud on the day 
of the referendum (18 September) is miniscule, suggesting that almost no polling fraud was 
observed by social media users. It is also noteworthy that there are relatively few tweets 
about fraud prior to the vote, undermining the ‘plot’ hypothesis. The only hypothesis that 
receives support from these data is the collective delusion hypothesis; the pattern of tweets is 
strongly consistent with the theory that fraud occurred to some voters retrospectively as a 
potential explanation for the result.  It appears that a portion of ‘yes’ supporters were 
unprepared to accept the result of the referendum, and fraud was their ‘sour grapes’ account 
of what went wrong. This finding is consistent with previous research in the ‘loser’s consent’ 
vein; we know from comparative data that those on the losing side in an electoral contest 
often cry foul as a way of reconciling their expectations with the electoral outcome 
(Anderson et al., 2005; Cantu, 2014). The results of this analysis also support the 
interpretation of the online referendum fraud debate by most commentators, including most 
who supported a ‘yes’ vote. In this sense they are not surprising, but it will be of use to 
electoral administrators and to students of electoral fraud alike to have an empirical basis for 
rejecting the ‘plot’ and ‘fraud’ hypotheses. 
 
V Conclusion 
UK electoral legislation is based on the assumption that electoral misconduct will rarely be 
attempted, but it does still occur. Neither the hypothesis of actual fraud nor the hypothesis of 
a concerted effort to seed doubt in voters’ minds in the run-up to the voting is supported by 
the data presented here. Instead, tweets about fraud spiked immediately after the results were 
released, which is consistent with the interpretation that this online activity was a 
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manifestation of collective delusion borne out of an inability or unwillingness to accept the 
outcome of the referendum.  
At the same time, there is still cause for concern when a section of the citizenry is not 
confident in the conduct of an electoral process. Aspects of the UK electoral process lack a 
range of security measures that are common in states where electoral abuse is more common. 
With confidence in electoral conduct falling, it may well be time to consider introducing 
some of these measures so as to address concerns about fraud and other forms of abuse. The 
requirement to show identity cards at polling stations has already been recommended by the 
Electoral Commission (Electoral Commission, 2014a) and is being piloted by the UK 
government in 2017; other measures that might usefully be considered include stricter 
regulation of the chain of custody of ballot papers, more rigorous training of polling station 
staff, and limitations on the availability of postal and proxy votes. Even if such measures do 
not markedly improve what is already a very high standard of electoral performance in most 
parts of the UK (including Scotland), they are likely to go a significant way toward 
improving confidence in electoral conduct. 
These results of this analysis have implications for the burgeoning efforts to employ 
data mining techniques to identify incidents of fraud in elections around the world (e.g. Yang, 
Ounis and Macdonald, 2016). Though such techniques may be very useful in many contexts, 
they will need to be capable of sifting through large amounts of speculative allegations 
lacking evidence in order to identify reports of fraud that are corroborated. The findings of 
this paper also hint that such techniques must be used with extreme caution in contexts where 
fraud is not expected a priori. 
A final lesson to be learnt from this paper is the utility of combining the traditional 
approaches and tools of political science with recent developments in data mining and text 
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classification. The analysis presented here shows the huge benefits that can be gained by 
reaching beyond the tools of political science and engaging in multidisciplinary data science.  
 Future research could usefully examine the pattern identified here in a wider range of 
contexts, in order to determine whether the timing of ‘Twitter storms’ can be used a reliable 
means of interpreting them. If this is the case, users of this method would then need to 
determine under what conditions this method might not work well, an also how easy it might 
be for Twitter users to manipulate their behavior in order to ‘game’ such interpretations.  
Another future research area that follows from this analysis is the link between online 
and offline behavior; it would be of interest to examine, for example, whether those who are 
more concerned about fraud are also more likely to be social media users, or to verify the 
supposition that those who find themselves on the losing side in an election or a referendum 
are more likely to tweet about fraud. The role of online allegations of fraud in conditioning 
actual electoral behavior is also an interesting area of possible investigation; a study of ‘fake 
news’ in the US 2016 presidential election demonstrated that false news stories were believed 
by over half of all those who viewed or read them (Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, 2017), 
raising concerns about the ability of Twitter storms such as that studied here to condition the 
future orientations of their participants toward politics. The advent of social media has 
opened up a wide range of research possibilities to computer scientists and data scientists 
alike, and the study of social media content about fraud promises to enrich our understanding 
of both electoral integrity and online communication. 
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Appendix: Classification Strategy Selection Procedure 
This appendix details the methods used to select the Support Vector classification strategy 
used on this analysis. Three commonly-used classifier models were tested: Naïve Bayes (NB) 
(Weiss, Indurkhya, Zhang, & Damerau, 2005), Decision Trees (DT) (Manning & Schütze, 
1999) and Support Vector Machine (Kubat, 2015).  
The models were implemented using the algorithm packages e107 and C50 in the R 
programming language. The task of the classifier was to classify the tweets according to 
whether or not they contain allegations of fraud. Following best practice in machine learning, 
a two-stage process was employed in order to refine the classification. Two different datasets 
were created and used sequentially; each was split into a training dataset and a testing dataset. 
The first dataset (DS1) was generated by filtering the 10 per cent sample using fraud-related 
keywords (rigged, fraud, claims, investigate and police). This dataset contains 5,413 tweets 
with about 10 percent ‘positive’ tweets (those containing allegations of fraud) and about 90 
percent ‘negative’ tweets (those not containing allegations of fraud). DS1 was split into 3,788 
tweets as a training dataset and 1,625 tweets as a test dataset. When DS1 was used to train the 
three models (NB, SVM and DT), DS worked only if the MostFreqTerms (most frequent 
terms) setting was greater than or equal to 50. The MostFreqTerms setting entails removal of 
a term from the vector space model if it does not appear in at least 50 documents. This setting 
is risky; if we used it we sacrifice the words that occur less frequently, and these words could 
also be important features for the model to learn from. Table A1 show the results of the three 
models on the testing set using different settings. For fewer ‘most frequent words’ (found in 
at least 10 documents) SVM gave better results than NB. 
– Table A1 about here – 
The second dataset (DS2) was built by applying the NB and SVM models to the first dataset. 
The tweets classified as referring to fraud were grouped with tweets containing words most 
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frequently found in the fraud tweets via semi-supervision classification. This method is 
typically used with very large datasets that cannot be checked manually. DS2 contains 5,782 
tweets split into a 4,044-tweet training set and a 1,738-tweet testing set. The dataset contains 
570 ‘positive’ tweets and 5,212 ‘negative’ tweets. The results of the two models are shown in 
Table A2.  
– Table A2 about here – 
 
In order to check for over-fitting, a virgin dataset was drawn from the original corpus by 
filtering on keywords ‘fraud’ and ‘rigging’.  Although the results of the above-reported 
testing set are better for SVM than NB, when the two models were used to classify the new 
unlabelled tweets (a virgin dataset), the results of the NB classifier were superior when 
compared to human classification (manual coding) of the same virgin dataset. The human 
classification data represents the average classifications of three different human coders who 
classified the same dataset manually. The performance of the two models on the virgin 
dataset is compared to the human classification in Table A3. The only limitation of NB model 
is that it is much slower than SVM. This experiment demonstrated that to classify the virgin 
data NB model took 21 minutes, whereas SVM took only two minutes when the ‘most 
frequent words’ setting was set to 1.  
- Table A3 about here - 
The preliminary results of these experiments thus show that the Naïve Bayes model 
retrieves more positive tweets than the Support Vector Machine model. This means that NB 
is higher in recall than SVM.  However, when a human went through the positively labeled 
tweets resulting from the models (the second experiment with MostFreqTerms=5), it was 
found that 80 tweets out of 2,382 were misclassified as positive by the NB model with error 
rate 0.033 per cent. In comparison, 64 tweets out of 2,032 were misclassified as positive by 
SVM with error rate 0.031 per cent. This means that there is no major difference between the 
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performance of the two models on new unlabelled data. This shows that the Support Vector 
Machine model retrieves more accurate positive tweets and is this higher in precision than the 
Naïve Bayes mode.  In this research precision is more important than recall, so SVM is the 
model that is used to classify tweets in this analysis. 
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Figure 1: Opinion poll results in the run-up to the referendum 
 
Source: Websites of polling firms Panelbase, YouGov, Survation, ICM, Opinium and Ipsos 
Mori. 
Notes: Data were taken from all polling organisations that are members of the British Polling 
Council. Figures are for likely voters (‘don’t know’ and ‘undecided’ figures not shown); 
dates are the midpoint of each period of fieldwork. 
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Figure 2: The distribution of fraud tweets over the time   
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Table 1: Distribution of Tweets by Day 
Date Total number of 
tweets 
Fraud tweets Non-fraud 
tweets 
08/09/14 29440 148 29292 
09/09/14 33960 80 33880 
10/09/14 37000 39 36961 
11/09/14 41070 41 41029 
12/09/14 32220 207 32013 
13/09/14 33980 22 33958 
14/09/14 33730 63 33667 
15/09/14 39140 83 39057 
16/09/14 47980 64 47916 
17/09/14 57550 44 57506 
18/09/14 126900 145 126755 
19/09/14 168620 1549 167071 
20/09/14 31620 571 31049 
21/09/14 16980 349 16631 
22/09/14 13050 160 12890 
23/09/14 21942 313 21629 
24/09/14 11270 190 11080 
25/09/14 9170 311 8859 
26/09/14 9100 163 8937 
27/09/14 8700 92 8608 
28/09/14 7510 165 7345 
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Table A1: Results of Three Classification Models on DS1 
Model Error rate Precision Recall F-measure Settings 
SVM 0.02 0.988 0.98 0.98 MostFreqTerms=50  
NB 0.04 0.97 0.978 0.97 MostFreqTerms=50  
DT  0.02 0.99 0.977 0.98 MostFreqTerms=50  
SVM 0.02 0.992 0.98 0.985 MostFreqTerms=10 
NB 0.04 0.96 0.98 0.969 MostFreqTerms=10  
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Table A2: Results of Three Classification Models on DS2 
Model Error rate Precision Recall F-measure Settings 
NB   0.05926352  0.9776643  0.9575  0.95 MostFreqTerms=10 
SVM  0.04833142   0.9968092  0.9518586  0.96 MostFreqTerms=10 
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Table A3: Classification of the Virgin dataset 
Human Classification NB SVM Settings 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative  
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